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CONVERGING TRAJECTORIES: INTEREST
CONVERGENCE, JUSTICE KENNEDY, AND JEANNIE SUK'S
"THE TRAJECTORY OF TRAUMA"
Jennifer S. Hendricks*
Although Jeannie Suk's "The Trajectory of Trauma: Bodies and
Minds of Abortion Discourse"' is primarily descriptive rather than
normative, it has an undercurrent of criticism of feminist advocacy,
suggesting that feminist efforts to seek the law's protection have yielded
excessive paternalism. Before accepting this critique, readers should
consider other pieces of the puzzle, especially other forces behind the
law's inclination to paternalism and the opportunities for feminists to
use that inclination strategically.
Suk identifies two related strands of feminist analysis that have made
their way into legal doctrine: first, skepticism about the voluntariness of
women's choices under conditions of gender subordination; second,
sympathy for psychological trauma, with relatively low thresholds for
what might be traumatic.' She describes how these two strands have
manifested themselves in rape law reform' and aggressive prosecution of
domestic violence.' Beyond those areas, however, Suk argues that
feminists are responsible for legitimizing a paternalistic attitude toward
women that came home to roost in the infamous passage in Gonzales v.
Carhart (Carhartl): "While we find no reliable data to measure the
phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come
to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and
sustained. Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow."5
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, treated this possibility of
regret as a justification for banning a particular abortion procedure
known as intact dilation and evacuation (D&E) or, more controversially,
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law.
1. 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1193 (2010).
2. Id. at 1237-52.
3. See id. at 1204-05 ("Rape trauna played a key role in legal reform.").
4. See id. at 1209-11 ("[Battered Women Syndrome] has had broad legal impact,
especially in the criminal context.
5. 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (internal citations omitted). Carhad I was Stenberg v.
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), which struck down Nebraska's ban on partial-birth abortion.
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partial-birth abortion.
Are feminists to blame for this paternalism? Suk places her thesis in
opposition to Reva Siegel's argument that Justice Kennedy's paternalism
is traceable to outdated norms of the patriarchy. Suk lays the blame
instead at the door of modern feminism." While Suk is cautious about
her claims of causation,7 she argues that old-fashioned paternalism
would be unexpected from Justice Kennedy-the Justice Kennedy "of
Casey's plurality opinion"-and that modern, feminist-legitimized
paternalism is the better explanation.
Suk tells a story of feminism's influence on the law, but before
drawing conclusions we must also consider the law's influence on
feminism. Feminist causes, such as the battered women's movement,
have at times engaged in paternalism that other feminists have judged
misguided and even harmful." But if those critics are correct, an
important piece of the explanation for the mistakes is likely to be that
feminist advocacy has been shaped by patriarchal culture, rather than, or
in addition to, the reverse. Feminism, in other words, did not only
legitimate paternalism; paternalism and other social forces helped to
legitimate some feminist reforms. Suk's critique of feminist paternalism
needs to be supplemented with a discussion of traditional paternalism
and its influence on how feminist advocacy enters the law.
This Essay suggests that Derrick Bell's theory of interest
convergence"' provides a useful framework for telling a different story
about the cultural, legal, and rhetorical evidence adduced by Suk. In
Part I, I point out that feminist claims about choice and trauma have
been incorporated into law selectively, and I suggest that the pattern of
selectivity might be explained by interest convergence. Feminists have
strategically used the law's existing norms and biases to win feminist
goals. The legal culture, in turn, has shaped the boundaries of
acceptable argument and has changed in ways that are at times
consistent with feminist goals but that are also influenced by other
interests, biases, and agenda. In Part II, I turn to the abortion cases as
examples of interest convergence at the micro level. Following Suk, I
use the example of Casey and its holding that Pennsylvania's husband-
consent requirement was unconstitutional." I argue that this holding
did not rest solely on a paternalistic view of women as victims. That the
6. Suk, supra note 1, at 1234-35.
7. Cause and effect cannot be clear cut when the question is what influence a
pervasive cultural trope has had on a particular event, and Suk refers to feminist
paternalism as, for example, a "cultural influence" that provided "fertile soil" for the
abortion trauma argument, rather than making strong claims of cause and effect. Id. at
1246, 1252.
8. Id. at 1243.
9. Suk acknowledges many of these oppositional voices within the feminist
movement. See id. at nn. 24-25 and accompanying text (collecting citations to feminist
scholarship critical of trauma narratives).
10. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Boad of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 Hary. L. Rev. 518, 523 (1980).
11. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 833 (1992).
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Court emphasized a logically weak, paternalistic rationale at the expense
of a stronger rationale grounded in sex equality may have had less to do
with feminist success than with Justice Kennedy's status as the swing vote.
Similarly, Carhart II's continuity with old-fashioned paternalism and
sexism is revealed by its impulse to control rather than empower
wonen-that is, to protect women from the nental trauma claimed to
result from their abortion choices but simultaneously to reject the risk of
uterine perforation as significant enough to trigger a constitutionally
required health exception.
Suk sets feminist arguments next to antifeminist arguments and
convincingly argues that they partake of the same cultural milieu.
Choice, however, is constrained not just for victims but for everyone,
including feminist lawyers and reformers. Before passing judgment on
the paths our predecessors trod, we should take a broader view of the
choices, constraints, and tradeoffs they faced.
I. SELECTIVITY AND INTEREST CONVERGENCE
That trauma has deleterious effects on rational decisionnaking is
not a new idea in the law. Traditionally, though, the law had more
sympathy for the trauma of a cuckold than for that of a battered woman.
His use of violence was comprehensible, and potentially justifiable, to
the law in a way that hers was not." Convincing the law to see the
constraints that explain "why she stayed," to see things from the
perspective of a rape victim who fails to resist to the utmost, to see the
sex discrimination in sexual harassment-these are major
accomplishments.
The feminist critique of choice and consent, however, has gone
mainstream only selectively. Law and culture remain radically devoted
to choice when it comes to, for example, work-family conflicts.'
Perhaps, as Suk suggests, a presumption of coercion arises more readily
in matters related to women's sexual bodies.' 4 Even in that context,
however, one finds an inconsistent patchwork of paternalism and
autonomy. When there is money to be made in infertility treatment or
surrogacy contracts, honoring women's choices usually trumps
12. See generally North Carolina v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989) (finding
battered woman's killing of her husband was not justified by perfect or imperfect self-
defense); Katherine T. Bartlett & Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and Law: Theory, Doctrine,
Commentary 344-63 (5th ed. 2010) (excerpting and discussing California v. Berry, 556
P.2d 777 (Cal. 1976)); Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who
Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 71 (1992) (arguing men who
claim adultery as provocation for killing their wives receive lower sentences than those
who do not).
13. See, e.g., Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of
Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1559, 1560-62 (1991) (analyzing rhetoric of choice in abortion
and "working mother" debates).
14. See Suk, supra note 1, at 1228-29 (noting "influential questioning of the
meaningfulness of sexual consent . . . tends to prove too much when extended").
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preventing psychic trauna. Courts are also prone to reminding women
of the many choices they had in the past as justification for judicial
control of their reproductive bodies in the present, such as by forcible
cesarean section." The rhetoric of choice and the rhetoric of constraint
are both readily available to serve either feminist or nonfeminist ends.
The law's embrace of feminist analysis is more likely selective than
random. That is, feminist arguments are more likely to be accepted
when their logic, methods, and goals correspond to those of players with
power in the legal system.' 7  This is Derrick Bell's theory of interest
convergence, which he offered to explain Brown v. Board of Education.'
Bell argued that Brown's outcome was not the result of an enlightened
judiciary that realized the injustice of Jim Crow. Rather, it happened
because the persistence of segregation was hurting the United States in
the Cold War' 1 The system changed when the interests of the powerful
needed it to change; justice, if it occurred, was a collateral benefit.
According to this theory, feminist paternalism will find greater
success in law when its goals coincide with other interests of the larger
society. For example, it is notable that the main examples of feminist
success described by Suk are in the field of criminal law. As Aya Gruber
has shown, rape law reforms and aggressive prosecution policies for
domestic violence are consistent with the values and goals of a punitive
society engaged in a "war on crime."" In addition, as Cynthia Lee has
described, interest convergence can take the form of "cultural
convergence," in which novel legal arguments succeed in part because
they resonate with the biases of the dominant culture.21  Thus,
paternalistic arguments for feminist causes are especially likely to be
successful because they resonate with pre-existing attitudes toward
women.
Interest convergence is not just a cynical theory of social change; it
15. See Unif. Parentage Act § 801, 805 (2002) (authorizing surrogacy contracts and
providing mechanisms to ensure their enforceability).
16. See Beth A. Burkstrand-Reid, The Invisible Woman: Availability and Culpability
in Reproductive HealthJurisprudence, 81 U. Colo. L. Rev. 97, 140-146 (2010) (describing
cases in which courts have ordered women to undergo cesarean sections).
17. I do not mean to deny that feminist actors have power in the legal system. The
"players with power" can include feminists.
18. Bell, supra note 10, at 518-19 (arguing "the interests of [whites and blacks]
converged to make the Brown decision inevitable").
19. Id.
20. Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 741, 792-801 (2007)
(discussing conservatives' involvement in domestic violence reform); Aya Gruber, Rape,
Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 Wash. L. Rev 581, 584-86 (2009) (discussing societal
criminalization of domestic violence and increased punishment of rapists).
21. Cynthia Lee, Cultural Convergence: Interest Convergence Theory Meets the
Cultural Defense, 49 Ariz. L. Rev. 911, 914 (2007). Lee studied cases in which criminal
defendants raised "cultural defenses," claiming that their cultural background explained
or excused what would otherwise appear to be Unjustifiable. She found that cultural
defenses were more successful when the claimed "foreign" cultural influence-often a




also offers a strategic framework for advocates." Consider, for example,
the use of victims' sexual history against them in cases of alleged rape.
One might believe that in most cases, past consent to sex is irrelevant to
whether the complainant consented in the case at hand and then falsely
charged rape." Because legal actors traditionally deem sexual history
relevant, however, a good advocate marshals additional arguments. An
argument about protecting innocent victims from further trauma is
more likely to sway a fence sitter than an argument about women's right
to sexual liberty. Moreover, because having one's sexual history paraded
through a courtroom as justification for rape surely is traumatic in some
sense, the argument has the added advantage of being sincere. The
availability of a paternalistic argument for protecting women can support
a legal reform that has additional reasons for being on the feminist
agenda.
II. ABORTION RIGHTS ADVOCACY AND MICRO-INTEREST CONVERGENCE
With the rape and domestic violence examples as background, Suk
argues that the Supreme Court's abortion cases sustain a continuous
thread of paternalism from Roe to Casey to Carhart I." Focusing on
Casey, I propose a different account, in which strategic advocacy resulted
in deflecting the paternalist impulse away from control of women and
toward empowerment. The feminist interest in the right to abortion
converged with the cultural interest in gender paternalism.
Suk writes that Casey struck down the husband notification
requirement because women were vulnerable to abuse by their
husbands.2" As I read the relevant section of Casey, however, this victim
rationale competes for primacy with a sex equality rationale. Admittedly,
the victim rationale wins-it leads and dominates the discussion-but
the victory is not total, primarily because the victim rationale cannot
22. Joan Williams, for example, proposes tailoring feminist arguments about
abortion and working mothers in ways that will be most acceptable to prevailing social
views. See Williams, supra note 13, at 1588-94.
23. Excluding sexual history on this basis would not require a change in the Rules of
Evidence: Irrelevant and unduly prejudicial evidence is already inadmissible. Fed. R.
Evid. 402, 403. If one does not trust judges to make this assessment, a rape shield rule
might be preferable to case-by-case adjudication of relevance. See Fed. R. Evid. 412
(restricting admissibility of evidence offered to prove victim's sexual predisposition).
Many legal actors, however, will perceive the shield rule as a paternalistic exception to the
rule of relevance rather than a codified application of it.
Similarly, paternalism towards victims is not the only possible reason for mandatory
arrest and "no drop" prosecution policies in domestic violence cases. Such policies also
reduce the discretion exercised by police and prosecutors. See Leigh Goodmark,
Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of Mandatory Interventions in
Domestic Violence Cases, 37 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1-3 (2009) (stating reduction of police
discretion was primary motivation for mandatory arrest policies).
24. Suk, supra note 1, at 1243 ("The gender paternalism is found not merely in
antiabortion advocates' strategies, but more thoroughly in legal argument and discourse
about women over the past four decades.").
25. See id. at 1228 ("On this reasoning, Casey struck down a husband notification
requirement as unconstitutional.").
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distinguish husband notification from parent notification." If anything,
parents have far greater ability to become obstacles to abortion than
husbands do. If judicial bypass is adequate to protect minors, surely it is
adequate to protect adult women. Yet no one reading Casey would
conclude that more broadly worded exceptions or a bypass procedure
would have saved husband notification.
Why not? Because although children may not realize they will
benefit from the parents' involvement, "[w]e cannot adopt a parallel
assumption about adult women."27  Because such assumptions about
women "are no longer consistent with our understanding of the family,
the individual, or the Constitution."" And because "[a] State may not
give to a man the kind of dominion over his wife that parents exercise
over their children."" That is what a feminist argument looks like.
This section of Casey has the hallmarks of a sex equality argument
that played the victim card for a vote-Justice Kennedy's vote. As we
now know, the Casey dissenters had originally drafted a majority decision,
butJustice Kennedy was persuaded to embark on the Joint Opinion with
Justices O'Connor and Souter." In light of the paternalism of his
Carhart H1 opinion, it is plausible that he, or the need for his vote, played
a substantial role in the paternalistic tone of Casey's section on husband
notification.'
As Casey came to the Supreme Court, the most obvious paternalistic
argument supported the husband notification rule. Roe had relied on
paternalistic arguments for allowing abortion when the woman was
guided by her doctor;" Pennsylvania proposed to replace the doctor
with the husband. The Casey dissent argued that husband notification
would protect women because "some narried women are initially
inclined to obtain an abortion . . . because of perceived problems . . . that
may be obviated by discussion prior to the abortion."- The lawyers who
attacked the law, and the Justices who sought a fifth vote to strike it
down, prevailed in part by developing an alternative narrative of female
trauma. Their portrait of women as victims dominates the rhetoric of
the opinion, with sex equality popping in to move the reasoning along.
This is not to say that abuse is not a real concern; it is to say that abuse
and victimization were not the only problems with the Pennsylvania
statute." By focusing on one very narrow category of victim, Casey
26. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895-96 (1992).
27. Id. at 895.
28. Id. at 897.
29. Id. at 898.
30. Linda Greenhouse, Becoming Justice Blackmun: Harry Blackmun's Supreme
CouttJourney 203-04 (2005).
31. Recall that this was the only provision in the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act
that was struck down in Casey, other than an ancillary record-keeping requirement. Casey,
505 U.S. at 833-34.
32. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 163, 165-66 (1973).
33. 505 U.S. 833, 974-75 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
34. As Planned Parenthood's lawyer briefly tried to explain at oral argument, the
husband notification rule in fact affected every married woman seeking an abortion, not
68 Vol. 110:63
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prevented untold numbers of married women from having to certify that
they had paid proper obeisance to their husbands before seeking
medical care. That looks like interest convergence on a micro level.
While the potential trauma of a small number of women in Casey
supported a holding that protected many more women's equality, the
potential trauma of a small number of women in Carhart H1 supported
limits on all women's liberty. The solicitude for women's trauma in the
first part of Carhart II, upholding the ban on intact D&E, stands in stark
contrast to the second part of the opinion, upholding Congress's refusal
to qualify the ban with a health exception. As I have argued elsewhere,
this refusal was a salvo in an upcoming battle over the scope of the
required health exception-namely, whether it must include all
increased risks or only "significant" ones and whether it must include
mental health.3 5
The primary benefit of intact D&E touted by Dr. Carhart and others
is that it minimizes the use of sharp instruments inside the uterus.- The
arguments against the ban focused on the women for whom a slip of the
knife is especially risky: women with, for example, bleeding disorders,
clotting problems, or sepsis. 7  By holding that the lack of health
exception could only be challenged as applied to such women, the Court
effectively held that the mere increased risk of a perforated uterus or
lacerated cervix in an otherwise healthy woman was not "significant"
enough to trigger the health exception. Moreover, the Court also
ignored that one of the clinical indications for intact D&E is abortion of
a wanted pregnancy in which the parents desire an intact fetus to hold,
grieve, and bury."'
only those who did not want to notify their husbands. Transcript of Oral Argument at 22,
51, Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Nos. 91-744, 91-902).
35. See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Body and Soul: Equality, Pregnancy, and the Unitary
Right to Abortion, 45 Hary. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 329, 347-48 (stating Partial Birth Act
contains life exception, but not health exception because proponents did not want a
"minor health exception-i.e. anything short of death-to be used to invoke the health
exception").
36. See Carhiad II, 550 U.S. 124, 177 (2007) (Ginsburg,J., dissenting) ("According to
the expert testimony plaintiffs introduced, the safety advantages of intact D&E are marked
for women with certain medical conditions, for example, uterine scarring, bleeding
disorders, heart disease, or compromised immune systems."); Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F.
Supp. 2d 805, 926-29 (2004) (summarizing arguments that D&E is medically safer). The
nature of this risk suggests that the relative risk between the two procedures depends in
part on the skill of the physician, which might explain some of the expert disagreement
over whether intact D&E is ever "necessary."
37. Cahar II, 550 U.S. at 177; Caharl v. Ashciofw, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 926-29.
38. Although the Court's holding is couched in terms of deferring to Congress,
future plaintiffs in as-applied challenges will have an especially difficult time overcoming
the Court's newfound deference to Congress's medical expertise: The fact that the
procedure is now completely banned will make it impossible to produce new evidence
regarding relative safety, except by using data from other countries.
39. See Maureen Paul et al., A Clinician's Guide to Medical and Surgical Abortion
125 (1999) ("Grieving is important for the parents of an anomalous fetus, and seeing and
holding the fetus are important components of healing. Their needs may be better met
with an intact fetus (intact D&E procedure)."); see also Carhart v. Ashcro/I, 331 F. Supp. 2d
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In Carhart II, the potential for a woman to be traumatized by her
failure or refusal to mother received pride of place, despite its manifest
irrelevance to the question presented, while the potential trauma of a
perforated uterus was dismissed. In light of this contrast, it is difficult to
perceive Justice Kennedy as committed to sex equality but open to
paternalistic arguments because feminists have legitimized them. To the
extent that Suk posits second-wave feminism as responsible for Justice
Kennedy's paternalism in Carhar HI, she gives Justice Kennedy too much
feminist credit just for participating in the Casey joint opinion."' The
fault line here is not sympathizing with women's trauma and the
constraints under which they live; it is responding to those realities with
control rather than empowerment.
CONCLUSION
Whether Justice Kennedy's paternalism in Carhart H1 was old-
fashioned and regressive or modern and feminist is not a strictly
either/or question. Roe's paternalism is plainly of the old-fashioned
kind. Casey's serves a feminist goal, but its outcome is more likely to have
been the result of feminist strategy to appeal to a paternalist than of
Supreme Court Justices adopting paternalism because the feminists did.
As for Carhart H, if it walks like a duck and it quacks like a duck, we
should not discount the very strong possibility that it is a duck.
Should feminists regret their own paternalism? For feminists
offended by Carhart H, Suk's "Trajectory" highlights the opportunity to
refine our analysis of how the law should treat questions of limited
agency, particularly in traumatic contexts. Perhaps we need a more
sophisticated vocabulary for talking about constrained choices in a way
that distinguishes overt, criminal level coercion from structural
constraints that warrant reform, and that distinguishes both from the
inherent constraints of any life. Seeing the tools of feminist analysis
wielded by political opponents may also highlight places where feminist
analysis has gone astray. Suk argues that a common thread in the
abortion cases from Roe to Carhar HI is the habit of "inferring from
at 904 ("In the fetal indication procedure, ... these are pregnancies, generally, that were
planned and very much wanted, and the patient and family are going through a very
stressful time and frequently want the opportunity to say good-bye to the fetus, to be able
to hold it and examine it."). There, I've done it-invoked a competing trauma narrative.
See how tempting it is?
40. Justice Kennedy's record on gender issues cannot be characterized as feminist,
even before Ciar H1 and regardless of Casey. He voted to strike down the Family and
Medical Leave Act in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721,
744 (2003), and the civil rights remedy of the Violence Against Women Act in United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000). He also voted to sustain the archaic sex
classification that governs U.S. citizenship for children born abroad in Nguyen v. INS, 533
U.S. 53, 73 (2001). In the latter case, he proposed that the United States had a legitimate
interest in avoiding citizenship claims by the unacknowledged children of male American
soldiers and businessmen who travel and procreate abroad. See Jennifer S. Hendricks,




potential psychological harm the state's interest in protecting women
from said harm." 1 Roe and Casey, however, ultimately put the woman in
charge of assessing the potential harm and deciding what to do about it,
while Carhart H1 claimed a state interest in protecting women against
their own will. That is not a trivial distinction, but if it is the one on
which feminist criticism of Carhart H1 rests, then we must reconsider, for
example (and as many feminists have argued), the victim-disregarding
approach to mandatory domestic violence prosecutions.4 2 On the other
hand, feminists should regret neither their underlying critique of
consent and choice nor their efforts to honor the ways in which women
suffer. Efforts to understand and improve the human condition should
not be avoided just because some of the tools of analysis can be misused,
whether intentionally or unintentionally.
The harder questions about this kind of feminist advocacy are
whether, when, and how an advocate should try to use interest
convergence to her advantage. This dilemma is familiar to all litigators
but especially to those involved in impact or cause litigation. Choosing
between the principled but risky argument and the less palatable but
safer one requires a clear assessment of priorities: the short term or the
long term? The cause or the client? There is no one-size-fits-all answer,
but "Trajectory" provides a valuable case study for thinking about the
ramifications of these strategic questions. Its sweep, however, takes in
only one slice of the full trajectory of feminist ideas in the law. We need
to consider the additional slices highlighted in this Essay before drawing
conclusions about the past or lessons for the future.
Preferred Citation: Jennifer S. Hendricks, Converging Trajectories: Interest
Convergence, Justice Kennedy, and Jeannie Suk's "The Trajectory of Trauma",
110 COLUTM. L. REv. SIDEBAR 63 (2010),
http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/sidebar/volume/110/63_He
ndricks.pdf.
41. Suk, supra note 1, at 1223.
42. See, e.g., Goodmark, supra note 23, at 5-14 (explaining mandatory arrests and
"no drop" prosecution in domestic violence cases); cf. Jody Lynee Madeira, Common
Misconceptions: Reconciling Legal Constructions of Women in the Infertility and
Abortion Contexts 4-6 (Mar. 5, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.con/abstiact=1565172 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing
feminist legal scholars adhere to rhetoric of liberty and choice with respect to abortion
while adopting rhetoric of protectionism with respect to women seeking treatment for
infertility).
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